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The persistent Current account imbalances of the United S~ates,
Japan, and Germany have been a source of surprise, concern, and
puzzlement to international policymakers since the turnaround of the
dollar in 1985, and even before that. Prescriptions to reduce these
imbalances have become the central point of international policy analy-
ses, as in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook
(1988) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment’s OECD Econo~nic Outlook (1988). In this paper we review the
existing projections of these imbalances and present a dynamic model
that can be used to analyze the sources of the imbalances and the
policies to reduce them. We use the model to discuss scenarios that the
international organizations have developed, and we present alternative
scenarios that may be preferable.
In the opening section we review the existing projections. First, we
show the projected 1989 imbalances for the three countries in the context
of the world distribution of imbalances. Here, the question of European
integration comes forward immediately. The German current account
surplus for 1989 is projected at $40-45 billion, while the surplus of
OECD Europe is less than $10 billion and that of the European
Community, about $15 billion. Thus, concern about the German surplus
would be greatly reduced if Germany were considered to be part of an
integrated Europe. Next we review the IMF and OECD reference
scenarios based on current and announced future policy for the three
countries. These show persistent, large imbalances out to 1992, and
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support the organizations’ proposals for policy changes in the direction
of an expansion of domestic demand in Japan and Germany, and
contraction in the United States.
A small theoretical model is developed in the following section that
is used to illustrate the sources of the current imbalances in fiscal shifts
in the early 1980s and to analyze the effects of proposed shifts in policy,
interpreted as fiscal adjustments. The model is a dynamic version of the
"fundamentals" model in Branson (1988), which is, in turn, a two-
country version of the model in Branson (1985). We interpret the
position of the three countries in 1988 as a point along a dynamic
adjustment path that began in the early 1980s and includes the turn-
around in 1985. We then show the effects ~of the policy shifts from that
point. This differs from earlier analyses such as that in Krugman (1987)
or Branson (1988), which at least implicitly begin from points of
equilibrium. The basic result is that the policy sldifts would be accom-
panied by further real depreciation of the dollar against the DM and yen
except for one case. That is the case of a large, anticipated fiscal shift
where the market causes the dollar to depreciate so much in anticipation
of the shift that it appreciates when the shift finally occurs. In this case,
the current account imbalances would have to be anticipated to reverse
under existing policies, including the anticipated fiscal shift. None of the
projections includes this case, so it seems safe to rule it out.
Our versions of three alternative scenarios considered by the IMF
(1988) and the OECD (1988) are then presented and discussed. These are
(1) a market-driven depreciation of the dollar, (2) fiscal contraction in the
United States alone, and (3) fiscal contraction in the United States and
expansion in Japan and Germany. These alternatives are produced
using a system operating at the Bank of Italy that compares alternative
projections of the international institutions and can produce additional
projections using the multipliers from the different organizations’ mod-
els. The projections of the alternative scenarios are consistent with the
theoretical model, with further dollar depreciation in the fiscal policy
scenarios. Scenario 2, with fiscal contraction in the United States alone,
produces a slowdown in growth in all areas, more marked in the OECD
model. The largest projected reduction in the U.S. current account
deficit, $86 billion by 1992, comes in Scenario 1 in the IMF model.
The balanced fiscal policy scenario, with the United States contract-
ing and the others expanding, would leave world saving and therefore
average world real interest rates approximately unchanged. To reduce
real interest rates and benefit the developing country debtors, the
aggregate fiscal deficit would have to be reduced, as in Scenario 2. But
that scenario maximizes the chance of recession. So we have developed
alternative scenarios with fiscal contraction in the United States and
monetary expansion in Japan and Germany. These scenarios are dis-
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since late 1986. They produce nearly as much adjustment in the U.S.
current account as the balanced fiscal scenario, with more projected
growth outside the United States and lower real interest rates. Thus, we
conclude that these scenarios may be preferable to the others.
Current Account Projections
In recent years a number of international organizations, including
the IMF and the OECD, have formulated alternative medium-term
scenarios to aid in the analysis of the problems of adjustment of external
imbalances of various groups of countries. The alternatives are generally
built upon a baseline scenario that is a run of a simulation model,
sometimes econometric, assuming existing policy, somehow defined.
The alternatives then change the policy assumptions and rerun the
model, taking into account to some extent the possibility that the policy
changes will themselves alter the behavioral equations of the model.
The projections discussed in this section are based on the reference
scenarios (or baselines) derived from the IMF Multimod and the OECD
Interlink models, assuming (a) no change in current or announced
policies, (b) a predicted path for key exogenous variables such as oil and
other commodity prices, and (c) approximately unchanged real ex-
change rates over the simulation period. (The details of the assumptions
are given in the notes to table 3.) The time horizon of the simu’lations is
five years, beginning in 1988. The IMF scenario is reported in IMF (1988);
the OECD scenario is in a background document for OECD (1988). Here
we use the reference scenarios to discuss the distribution of current
account imbalances internationally, and the projected evolution of the
imbalances of the United States, Japan, and Germany.
The projected world current account balances for 1989 are shown in
table 1. The first column gives the OECD projections in billions of
dollars, and the second in percent of GNP, where available. The third
column compares the IMF projections as a percent of GNP. The table is
based on the OECD projections because they include the dollar amounts
and more countries. The OECD current account deficit in 1989 is
projected to be $64 billion, with deficits of $144 billion in North America
and $9 billion in the Antipodes, and surpluses of $80 billion in Japan and
$9 billion in Europe. The Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs)
show a surplus of $24 billion (a range of $22-32 billion in the IMF
projections), and the rest of the world (ROW) a $26 billion deficit.
The world deficit, or current account discrepancy, in the OECD
projections of table 1 is $66 billion. The world deficit in the IMF
projections is $60 billion. The IMF breaks this down into a trade surplus
of $39 billion and deficits of $84 billion on services and $15 billion on
transfers (IMF 1988, p. 143).22 Willia~n H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
Table 1
World Current Accounts, 1989
OECD Projections IMF Projections
Area or Country $ billion % GNP % GNP
OECD -64 -.4 -.3a
, North America -144 -2.6
United States - 132 -2.6 -2.6
Canada -12 -2.2 -2.3
Japan 80 2.6 2.5
OECD Europe 9 .2
Australia-New Zealand -9 -3.0





Rest of World (ROW) -26
(OPEC) -4
World Total -66
a IMF total for industrial countries, which excludes OECD countries Greece, Portugal, and Turkey.
b IMF estimated range for Asian NlCs.
Source: OECD (1988), IMF (1988).
Aside from the world deficit, the main impression we get from table
I is that North America (mainly, of course, the United States) and Japan
have large imbalances, both in levels and as fractions of GNP, and that
the NICs and the ROW also have marked imbalances. These are smaller
in levels, but larger in terms of GNP, and about the same size. OECD
Europe and Australia-New Zealand have imbalances that are small in
levels, but large as a fraction of GNP in the latter area. Among the
industrial countries, the impression is one of large imbalances in the
United States, Japan, and the NICs, with much smaller ones in Europe
and the Antipodes. Any problem concerning Germany disappears into
the OECD Europe aggregate in table 1.
The distribution of imbalances within Europe is shown in table 2,
which follows the same format as table 1. In table 2 we see the amplitude
of imbalances across Europe. The biggest imbalance in levels is Germa-
ny’s, while Norway’s is the biggest in terms of GNP.
The data of table 2 can be looked at in several ways. Clearly there is
a large offset to the $42 billion German surplus. The surplus of the
European Monetary System (EMS) countries is $39 billion, so the rest of
the EMS is roughly in balance. Thus the offset is a deficit in the non-EMS
countries. The European Economic Community (EEC) has a surplus of
$16 billion, so the EEC non-EMS members have a collective deficit of $23
billion. A non-institutional way to look at the data is suggested by theIMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 23
Table 2
OECD Europe Current Accounts, 1989
OECD Projections IMF Projections
Area or Country $ billion % GNP % GNP
OECD Europe 9.0 .2
Surplus Countries 55
Belgium-Luxembourgab 2.0 1,2
Germany~b 42.0 3.3 3.1
Irelandab .5 1,2
Netherlands~b 4.5 1,9 1.8
Switzerland 6.25 3,1 3.2
Deficit Countries 45
Austria -.5 - 4
Denmarkab -2.5 -2.2
Finland -3.25 -2.9























Source: OECD (1988), IMF (1988). Differences in degree of rounding are in the source tables.
separation of surplus and deficit countries in table 2. The surplus
countries are a core group around Germany. Viewed from this aspect,
all of the periphery except heroic Ireland is in deficit.
The extent to which we should consider the German, or the core,
surplus as an independent imbalance, rather than submerge it into a
European aggregate, depends on how integrated we think the aggregate
is. We do not break out states or regions in the United States for
purposes of this analysis because we consider that country to be
definitively integrated. Suppose we considered the EMS to be integrated
from the point of view of financing external imbalances. Then we would
see the core EMS surplus as automatically financing the EMS deficits,
and the external surplus shrinks to $39 billion. If we accept the Single
European Act as expressing a definitive decision on integrating the EEC
from this point of view, then the EMS surplus is automatically available
to finance EEC imbalances, and the external imbalance shrinks to $16
billion. If we think that the non-EEC members will take the necessary24 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
Table 3
IMF Reference Scenario (percentage growth rates, except where noted)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
United States
Real GNP                2.9 2.5 2.9 2.8 2,8 2.8
GNP Deflator 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 3,5
Current Balance
$ Billions -160.7 -138.5 -128.4 -113.0 -120,0 -128.0
Percent of GNP -3.6 -2.9 -2.5 -2.1 -2.1 -2,1
Japan
Real GNP 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6
GNP Deflator -.2 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 1,5
Current Balance
$ Billions 87.0 77.1 74.6 65.0 70,0 75.0
Percent of GNP 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.0 2,0
Real Exch. Rate (Yen/S) 179.16 160.23 160.23 160.23 160,23 160.23
Germany
Real GNP 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3 2,3 2.3
GNP Deflator 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
Current Balance
$ Billions 44.3 42.0 41.5 42.5 45.0 47.6
Percent of GNP 3.9 3.3 3.1 3.0 3,0 3.0
Real Exch. Rate (DM/$) 2.00 1.86 1.86 1.86 1,86 1.86
Source: Authors’ calculations on IMF data,
Table 4
©ECD Reference Scenario (percentage growth rates, except where noted)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
United States
Real GNP 2,9 2,4 1,7 2.1 2.2 2.2
Private Consumption Deflator 4,0 3,9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.2
Current Balance
$Billions -160,7 -134.0 -105.0 -108.0 -113.0 -116.0
Percent of GNP             -3.6 -2,8 -2,1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9
Japan
Real GNP 4.2 3.4 3,0 3.2 3.2 3.3
Private Consumption Deflator -.1 1.6 1,9 1.8 1.9 1.9
Current Balance
$ Billions 87.0 81,0 79,0 83.0 88.0 93.0
Percent of GNP 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6
Real Exch. Rate (Yen/S) 174.05 170.10 173,28 173.28 173.28 173.28
Germany
Real GNP 1.7 1.4 1.2 2,0 2.0 2.0
Private Consumption Deflator .5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4
Current Balance
$ Billions 44.3 41.0 32.0 31.0 32.0 34.0
Percent of GNP 3.9 3.3 2.5 2,3 2.2 2.2
Real Exch. Rate (DM/$) 2.05 1.94 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
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Key Assumptions for the Reference Scenarios (Tables 3 and 4)
IMF OECD
Fiscal Policy
United States: The fiscal position is
projected on the basis of currently
legislated expenditures and the existing
tax system; no allowance is made for
possible fiscal measures additional to
those that hav.e already been enacted
by the beginning of 1988. As a result,
the general government deficit as a
percent of GNP is projected to decline
from 2.2 percent in 1988 to 0.9 in 1992.
Japan: The general government financial
balance as a percent of GNP is
assumed to be roughly constant over
the projection period (-0.8 percent in
1988, -0.7 thereafter).
Germany: The general government
financial balance as a percent of GNP is
projected to reach -2.7 percent in 1988
(as against -1.7 in 1987) and to decline
somewhat in 1989; it is reach set at
-2.6 percent by the end of the
projection period.
Monetary policy is assumed to be aimed
at preventing any acceleration of
underlying inflation.
Fiscal Poficy
United States: Fiscal policy is based on
the October 1987 CBQ’s budgetary
projections, adjusted to take account of
the legislation passed on 21 st December
1987 and the OECD Secretariat’s esti-
mates of slower growth and higher
interest rates. In particular, the federal
deficit as a percent of GNP is projected
to decline from 2.4 percent in 1988 to
1.6 percent in 1992.
Japan: Fiscal consolidation is assumed
over the medium term with the general
government balance moving from -1.1
percent of GNP in 1988 to a small
surplus by the end of the projection
period.
Germany: The fiscal package due for 1990
is assumed to be implemented as
announced with income taxes cut by DM
19 billion; general government deficit as
a percent of GNP is projected to
increase from 2,3 percent in 1988 to 3
percent in 1992.
Monetary policy, in general, is
characterized by money growth
somewhat in excess of the growth of
nominal GNP; there is a slow movement
in nominal short-term and long-term
interest rates; real long-term interest
rates also gradually decrease over the
medium term.
Exchange rates are assumed to be
constant in real effective terms at their
January 1988 levels.
Exchange rates are stable in nominal
terms from November 1987 to the end of
1989 and broadly stable in real terms
thereafter.
steps to be within the single European market, we come back to the $9
billion surplus of OECD Europe. Thus how we view the core EMS
surplus in a world analysis depends on the degree of integration of the
core with concentric groups of increasing economic distance, and this
degree of integration itself is changing rapidly. So we are left with a
range of uncertainty between inclusion of two Europes into the analysis,
one with a surplus of around $55 billion and the other with a deficit of
$45 billion, or one Europe with a surplus of $9 billion.26 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
This uncertainty will not be resolved in this paper, partly because it
is the topic of a separate research program, but more importantly
because the available simulation models have not resolved it. The
models allow us to analyze adjustment among the United States, Japan,
and Germany, but not to expand or contract the European aggregate
easily. So for the simulation results in the rest of the paper, we will stay
with this aggregation, sometimes interpreting "Germany" as approxi-
mating "Europe."
The reference scenarios of the IMF and the OECD are summarized
in tables 3 and 4. Each shows the paths of real GNP, the private
consumption deflator as a measure of inflation, the current account
balance, and the real bilateral exchange rate for the United States, Japan,
and Germany. In both scenarios Japan grows faster than the United
States, which in turn grows faster than Germany. The growth rates in
the IMF scenario are higher than those in the OECD scenario for all three
countries, by about one-half of a percentage point. The OECD has a
higher inflation path for the United States, and lower inflation in Japan
and Germany.
The most striking aspect of both the scenarios is the persistence of
large external imbalances over the simulation horizon, based on current
policy. The United States deficit and the surpluses of Japan and
Germany shrink in both scenarios out to 1990, and then stabilize as a
percent of GNP. The two scenarios have similar paths for the United
States deficit, with the IMF at 2.1 percent of GNP in 1992, and the OECD
at 1.9 percent. The IMF projects a smaller surplus than the OECD for
Japan, 2.0 percent versus 2.6 percent in 1992, and a larger surplus for
Germany, 3.0 percent versus 2.2 percent in 1992. The sum of the two
surpluses in 1992 is about the same in the two projections, $122.6 billion
in the IMF scenario and $127 billion in the OECD’s. It is worth noting
that in the IMF scenario the intra-European imbalances are larger by
1992 than in the OECD scenario, as evidenced by the larger German
surplus.
In both scenarios, the real bilateral exchange rates remain approx-
imately constant after 1988, by assumption. The persistence of the large
current account imbalances then raises the question whether the finan-
cial markets are going to be willing to continue to finance these
imbalances at constant real exchange rates. The answer is, most proba-
bly no. The dollar would have to depreciate further against the DM (or
ECU) and especially the yen in the absence of policy action. The
secretariats use the apparent unsustainability of the reference scenarios
to argue for policy change in the direction of slower growth of domestic
demand in the United States and faster growth in Japan and Europe
(IMF 1988, pp. 24-26 and OECD 1988, pp. xi-xiv). Both concentrate on
fiscal contraction in the United States. The OECD is unclear on the
choice of demand policy instrument in Japan and Germany, as is theIMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 27
IMF in the case of Germany. The IMF favors monetary expansion in
Japan. Both secretariats appeal to structural adjustment in Europe and
Japan as policies to reduce the external imbalances.
The IMF and the OECD do not discuss explicitly the likely effect of
the policy changes on real exchange rates; this is understandable.
However, both treat the policy changes as substitutes for further
exchange rate adjustment. It is argued by Krugman (1987) and Branson
(1988), among others, that the policy changes would work to reduce the
external imbalances through changes in real exchange rates. This view is
supported both by theoretical analysis and by simulation experiments
on the IMF and OECD models.
Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
A shift in domestic demand growth between two areas operating
near their current levels of full-employment output will have predictable
effects on real exchange rates, as noted by Krugman (1987). A slowdown
in demand in the United States and an increase in Japan and Germany
(Europe) will reduce world demand for U.S. output and increase it for
Japanese and German output. This will tend to increase the prices of
Japanese and German output relative to the U.S. This is a real depreci-
ation of the dollar against the DM (ECU) and yen. In this section we
develop a two-country model that captures analytically the dynamics of
this adjustment of real exchange rates with exogenous shifts in real
domestic demand. The model is useful in interpreting the simulation
results that follow. It also produces the conditions under which the
policy shifts would be accompanied by dollar appreciation, rather than
depreciation, in real terms.
The model includes two countries, or areas; for concreteness we will
call the home country the United States and the foreign country with
starred * variables Japan. All variables in the model are real. The level of
output in both countries is taken as given, in order to concentrate on real
exchange rates and interest rates. This assumption can also be justified
by noting that medium-term recession or inflation is not an acceptable
part of an adjustment package. The policy shifts are represented as
exogenous shifts in fiscal positions. Expectations of movements in the
real exchange rate are rational, so the model is forward-looking and
solutions proceed from the long-run equilibrium to the short. Here we
present only the details needed to show the basic results; a full discusion
of the model is in the appendix. The model is a two-country version of
the fundamentals model in Branson (1985). It adds rational expectations
and stock-adjustment dynamics to the version in Branson (1988).28 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
The Model
The model has four equations, representing the national accounts,
or IS, equilibrium in the two countries, the arbitrage equilibrium
between the two financial markets, and the accumulation of their net
debt position via the current account. The national income equations are
D = S(r) - X(e,B), and
D* = S*(r*) + X(e,B). (2)
Here D,D* are the home and foreign country’s "structural" fiscal
deficits, since we assume full employment; S,S* are the excesses of
private saving over investment; X is the home country’s current account
surplus, r,r* are the real interest rates; e is the real exchange rate in terms
of home currency per unit of foreign exchange (so an increase signifies
a depreciation of the home currency); and B is the net debt of the home
to the foreign country. We assume that S and S* are increasing functions
of r and r*, and X is an increasing function of e and a decreasing function
of B. Since we have only two countries, the same X enters both
equations. To avoid problems in evaluation of B, we assume it is
denominated in an average of the two currencies.
The arbitrage condition that links the financial markets is
r = r* + ~ + p(B). (3)
Here 8 is the expected rate of change of the real exchange rate, and p is
a risk premium, increasing in B. This is a summary form of a portfolio
model in which debt in both currencies is held in international portfo-
lios. Equation (3) introduces real exchange rate dynamics into the
picture. The other dynamic equation is the accumulation of the debt
position, given by
1~ = -X(e,B). (4)
A home-country current account surplus reduces its debt position.
Long-Run Equilibrium
In the long-run equilibrium, the real exchange rate is expected to
remain constant, or trendless in a stochastic version of the model, so ~
in equation (3) would be zero. The current account would be balanced,
so X in equations (1), (2), and (4) would be zero. This would be the case
even if the two economies were on a balanced growth path, with each
accumulating the other’s debt.
The long-run solution of the model is recursive and simple. Equa-
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domestic private saving finances the budget deficit in each country. An
increase in D or D* eventually requires an increase in r or r* to finance
it domestically. Then equation (3) with 0 = 0 determines the debt
position that yields the risk premium p that equals the difference
between the two real interest rates. Finally, the requirement that X = 0
gives the value of the real exchange rate that is consistent with the debt
position. This is the value 6f the exchange rate that gives a trade balance
that just finances the debt service.
An example will illustrate the movement of long-run equilibrium.
Consider an increase in D, the home (U.S.) structural deficit. From
equation (1) with X = 0, the home r must rise to stimulate the excess
saving to finance the rise in D. From (3) with 0 = 0 and an increase in
r - r*, the home debt position must rise. This increases the debt service,
requiring a real depreciation in the long run to generate the trade
surplus to finance it. With X = 0 in the long run, if B increases so must
e. The United States is on a path towards this equilibrium in 1988.
Short-Run Equilibrium and Dynamics
In the short run, neither X = -I~ nor ~ need be zero, so we need the
entire model to locate the dynamic path to the long-run equilibrium. To
locate that path, we find the separate loci in e,B space along which
alternatively 1~ = 0 and ~ = 0. The long-run equilibrium is at their
intersection. Then we study graphically the dynamics around that point
to locate the unique stable saddlepath into it. This is the dynamic
adjustment path of B and e. Finally, we can do comparative dynamics by
seeing which locus is shifted by any given disturbance, and how the
saddlepath shifts.
The 1~ = 0 line in figure 1 is the locus of points along which X = 0.
An increase in B reduces X, and requires an increase in e to hold X to
zero. So along the I~ = 0 line the current account is in balance. Above it,
the home current account is in surplus, that is X > 0, and B is
decreasing. Above it, B is increasing. These dynamics of the debt
position are given by the horizontal arrows in figure 1. Any exogenous
event such as a change in tastes or technology that makes the home
country more competitive, that is, would genera.te a current account
surplus at the pre-existing equilibrium, shifts the B = 0 line down. Any
such event favoring the foreign country’s competitiveness shifts it up.
Derivation of the ~ = 0 line is a little more complicated. From
equation (3), an increase in B with ~ = 0 requires an increase in r - r*.
An increase in r increases S in equation (1), and a reduction in r* reduces
S* in equation (2). Both require an increase in X to maintain equilibrium
in (1) and (2). This requires an increase in e, and since X has increased,
the rise in e is greater than along the 1~ = 0 line. So the 0 = 0 line in figure
1 is steeper than the 1~ = 0 line.30 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
To obtain the dynamics of e around ~ = 0, begin with a point on the
line, and then consider an increase in e for a given B. The increase in e
increases X, requiring an increase in r and a decrease in r* to maintain
equilibrium in (1) and (2). This increases r - r* in equation (3), so for a
given B, ~ must become positive. For financial equilibrium to be
maintained with the interest differential greater than the risk premium,
the exchange rate must be expected to rise. Thus for financial market
equilibrium, if the exchange rate is higher than is compatible with zero
expected increase, it must be expected to rise even more. If expectations
are rational, the exchange rate will rise. Below the ~ = 0 line, the
exchange rate falls. These unstable dynamics are shown by the vertical
arrows in figure 1.
An increase in D or a decrease in D* shifts the ~ = 0 line down.
Consider an increase in D. For a given debt position, maintaining ~ = 0
in equation (3) requires that r and r* rise by the same amount. In
equation (2), with D* unchanged, the rise in r* and therefore S* requires
a fall in X and therefore e. This is consistent with an increase in S in
equation (1) that is smaller than the increase in D, so X goes down.
Similarly, if D* is reduced, both interest rates fall. In equation (1), the
resulting reduction in S with D unchanged requires a reduction in X and
therefore a reduction in e to maintain equilibrium. So an increase in D or
reduction in D* shifts ~ = 0 down, and a reduction in D or increase in D*
shifts it up.
Putting the dynamics of e and B together in figure 1, we see the
unique stable saddlepath ss into the equilibrium, lying between the I~ =
0 and ~ = 0 lines. The ss path has the properties that it goes to the
equilibrium E0, and along it expectations are realized. All the other paths
are speculative bubbles, heading off toward infinity along an asymptote
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position B, the exchange market searches for the e value that is on the
saddlepath into the new equilibrium.
We can illustrate the dynamics by returning to the example of an
unanticipated increase in the home (U. S.) structural deficit D. This shifts
the ~ = 0 line down, creating a new ss path that runs into a new
long-run equilibrium out along the I~ = 0 line in figure 1. The situation
is shown in figure 2. The original equilibrium from figure I is E0, and the
new equilibrium is E2. The new adjustment path is sis1 into E2. The real
exchange rate jumps down (dollar appreciates) to E1 at the original debt
position, creating a current account deficit. This then begins the adjust-
ment toward E2.
The path from E0 to El, and up towards E2, describes roughly the
path of the dollar since 1980. The shift in the structural fiscal deficit was
not sudden, unanticipated, and known fully at the time of its announce-
ment, so the movement from E0 to E~ proceeded by fits and starts,
ending in 1985. In addition, disturbances connected with the appear-
ance of the debt crisis in 1982, and a possible speculative bubble in
1984-85, added to the turbulence. The point here is just that the model
predicts the general outline of the movement, first appreciation then
depreciation, with a current account deficit accumulating the debt
position.
On this interpretation, in 1988 we are at a point such as El’, above
the original E0, but well short of E2. The OECD competitiveness
measures (OECD 1988, p. 55) show a gain of about 15 percent in 1988
over 1980, but no forecast says that at the existing exchange rates as of
mid-1988, the current account deficit would shrink to zero. So in the
discussion of policy alternatives to follow, we will assume that the
United States, Japan, and Germany are at a point like E~’ in figure 2.
Unanticipated Shift in Fiscal Policy in 1989
In order to set the stage for the analysis below of an anticipated shift
in fiscal positions, we can briefly discuss the effect of an unanticipated
shift beginning from the initial position of 1988, E~’ in figure 2. We focus
here on fiscal actions, but the results hold for any exogenous shift in
domestic demand. Suppose that at point E~’, the United States reduces
its fiscal deficit, and Japan and Germany increase theirs, all in an
unanticipated fashion. What path would we expect for the real exchange
rate? The answer is illustrated in figure 3.
Let us take point E~’ as the 1989 point on the path from E~ to E2 from
figure 2. The fiscal adjustment would shift the ~ = 0 locus back up,
giving a new long-run equilibrium along 1~ = 0 left of E2 in figure 3. The
real exchange rate would jump up (home currency depreciate) onto the
new ss path into the new equilibrium.32 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
If the fiscal adjustment were small enough that the new long-run
equilibrium is to the r!ght of E3 in figure 3, for example E~, the new ss
path would be below B = 0, and run up and right into it. Then the real
exchange rate would jump up and then continue up into the new
equilibrium with the current account deficit diminishing gradually to
zero. The fiscal shift would reduce the eventual depreciation by speed-
ing it up in the present. The final equilibrium would be between E2 and
E3,
The other alternative is
new equilibrium left of E3 in
path would be above l~ =
equilibrium. In this case the
home currency depreciating
a larger fiscal adjustment that moves the
figure 3, for example E~’. Then the new ss
0, and run left and down into the new
exchange rate would overshoot, with the
so much as to generate a current account
surplus, and then gradually appreciating back to equilibrium left of E3
on B = 0. If the fiscal adjustment moved the equilibrium exactly to E3,
the exchange rate would jump there and stop.
In all of these cases, the unanticipated fiscal adjustment generates a
jump real depreciation in the home currency. This speeds up adjust-
ment of the current account balance, and is the analytical basis for the
assertion that fiscal adjustment would cause a real depreciation of the





Anticipated Shift in Fiscal Deficits
Consider the case of a fiscal adjustment that is anticipated by the
markets. Then the basicresult from Wilson (1979) is that the real
exchange rate in the present model will jump onto an unstable bubble
path relative to the existing equilibrium such that it reaches the new ss
saddle path at the time when the anticipated fiscal shift occurs. Again,IMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 33
there are two cases, depending on the size of the correctly anticipated
shift. These are shown in figures 4(a) and 4(b).
For a small anticipated fiscal shift, the path would resemble that
from E~’ to a to b to E3 in figure 4(a). The new saddle path that will be
relevant when the shift occurs is below I~ = 0, and the exchange rate
jumps into an unstable path relative to E2 that takes it to point b when
the shift occurs. In this case the exchange rate shows first a jump
depreciation of the home currency to point a, and then further depre-
ciation to points b and E3, with the home deficit shrinking throughout.
The case of a large anticipated fiscal shift is shown in figure 4(b).
Here the relevant new saddle path is above I~ = 0, running down and
left to E3. Again, the adjustment path is El’ -~ a -~ b -+ E3. But in this
case, the trip along the unstable path from a to b carries the exchange
rate above B = 0, and the currency then appreciates from point b to E3
after the actual fiscal shift occurs. This is the case in which the fiscal shift
leads to an appreciation of the dollar. (It was first suggested to us in a
conversation with Francois Bourguignon.)
The border line between the two cases illustrated in figures 4(a) and
4(b) would be a fiscal shift that locates E3 on l~ = 0 to the right of E~’ just
enough that the trip along the unstable path from a to b ends at E3 when
the shift occurs, that is, a shift that makes points b and E3 the same. In
that case, no further adjustment would occur after the fiscal shift. It may
be interesting to note that this anticipated shift would be smaller than
the unanticipated shift that takes the equilibrium to E3 in figure 3. This
is because in the pre-announced case, the anticipatory jump in the
exchange rate provides a head start on the speeded-up reduction of the
current account deficit.
On the assumption that in 1988 a substantial correction in at least
the U.S. fiscal deficit is expected, which case of figure 4 is applicable?
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b when the fiscal shift comes, the current account of the home country
is in deficit, while in case (b) it is in surplus. Given the empirical J-curve
lags of adjustment of trade behind real exchange rates, this distinction
could be interpreted as follows. If projections including the fiscal shift
show an eventual surplus at current exchange rates after the shift, we
are in case (b), and the dollar would appreciate after the shift. If the
projections show an eventual deficit after the shift at current exchange
rates, then we are in case (a), and the dollar would depreciate. The
OECD and IMF projections show continued current-account deficits,
suggesting that case (a) holds, if in fact a fiscal shift is anticipated by the
markets.
Exogenous Increase in the Risk Premium
In order to connect with the discussion of the Multimod simulations
in the next section, here we briefly discuss the effect of an exogenous
increase in the risk premium p in equation (3) for a given level of the
debt position B, starting from the original equilibrium of figure 1. This
would shift the ~ = 0 line up, as shown in figure 5. The increase in p in
equation (3) requires an increase in r - r* to maintain financial
equilibrium with ~ = 0. The rise in r and fall in r* increase S and reduce
S* in equations (1) and (2). This requires an increase in X and therefore
in e.
The upward shift of the ~ = 0 line creates the new sis1 adjustment
path in figure 5. The real exchange rate jumps up to El, generating a
current account surplus. The exchange rate and debt position then fall
towards the new equilibrium at E2. This is the path we see in the
Multimod simulations below.
Figure 5
Exogenous Shift in the Risk Premium
S
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Alternative Fiscal Policy Scenarios
During 1988 the IMF and the OECD have used their models to
produce projections based on alternative assumptions about policies.
These are generally published as changes from the current reference
scenario. We have programmed these alternatives as linear multipliers
to be added to the updated reference scenarios as they appear. (See
Gomel, Marchese, and Martinez Oliva (1988) for details.) Three of these
policy alternatives are discussed in this section. We have also included
in the program the unit multipliers from each model so we can produce
our own alternative projections. One of these is discussed in the next
section.
The IMF Multimod is a close empirical representation of our
two-country theoretical model discussed above, with variable output
and prices sticky in the short run. It includes endogenous variation of
exchange rates and arbitrage equations with terms for risk premia. So
policy simulations with Multimod produce endogenous variations in
exchange rates. In addition, simulations can be performed with exoge-
nous variations in risk premia and endogenous variation in exchange
rates. Expectations in Multimod are forward-looking, so the simulations
include "model-consistent" exchange-rate expectations. A detailed de-
scription of the model, and a full set of multiplier runs, are provided in
Masson et al. (1988).
The OECD Interlink model has more price stickiness and output
variation than Multimod. Exchange rates are exogenous, and expecta-
tions adjust adaptively. A detailed discussion of Interlink and its
multipliers is provided in Richardson (1987). ’In performing comparative
simulations, we sometimes take the endogenous exchange rate results
from Multimod and use them as exogenous input to the Interlink
simulations. While the Interlink simulations and the OECD projections
provide more country coverage than Multimod, the latter is a closer
representation of the theoretical framework.
In this section we discuss three alternative policy scenarios over the
period 1989-92 using the two models. Scenario 1 is an exogenous
depreciation of the dollar in 1988. In Multimod, this is represented by a
shift in the risk premium; in Interlink, it is simply exogenous. Scenario
2 is a gradual reduction in the U.S. fiscal deficit from 1988 to 1992 which
is unanticipated until it is announced, with exchange rates endogenous
in Multimod, and constant in nominal terms in Interlink. Scenario 3 is a
gradual fiscal tightening in the United States and ease in Japan and
Germany from 1988 to 1992, with exchange rates endogenous in
Multimod and the dollar depreciating in nominal terms at 2 percent per
year against the DM and yen in Interlink. The Multimod simulations are
shown in table 5, and the Interlink simulations in table 6. To conserveTable 5                                                                                                                                ~
Alternative Fiscal Scenarios in Multimod                                                                                o,
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Pure Dollar Fiscal Restriction in
Depreciation United States
1989 1992 1989 1992
Scenario 3
Fiscal Restriction in U.S.,
Expansion in Japan, Germany, and
Endogenous Dollar Depreciation
1989 1992












Percent of GNP 2.2







Real Exch. Rate (DM!$)
-1.5 2.9 -,8 3.1 -.4 2.8 -.4 3.0 -.4 2.8 -.4
,4 3.2 .2 3.5 0 3.3 -.2 3.6 .1 3.4 .1
36,6 -41.9 86.1 -118.2 10.2 -91.3 36.7 -118.2 10.2 -85.2 42.8
,7 -.7 1.4 -2.3 .2 -1,5 .6 -2.3 .2 -1.4 .7
-1.6 4.1 .7 3.5 -.6 3.7 0 3.6 -.1 3.7 -.2
-2.9 .8 -6.6 1,1 -1.0 1.2 -2.3 1.2 -1.0 1.3 -2.1
-4,4 64.0 -11.0 68.7 -5.9 75.9 .9 67.5 -7.1 78.7 3.7
-,2 1.6 -.4 2,2 -.2 1.9 -.1 2.I -.3 1.8 -.2
-7,1 155.9 -2.7 155.7 -2.8 149.6 -6.6 151.8 -5.3 139.1 -13.2
-2.9 2.8 .5 1.4 -.9 2.5 .1 1.8 -.2 2.5 .6
-2.8 1.7 -5.3 1.4 -.9 2.1 -1.8 1.3 -1.2 2.2 2.0
37.5 -4.0 50.7 3.1 38.8 -2.7 50.0 2.4 37.5 -4.1 44.8 -2.8
2.7 -.4 3.0 0 2.8 -.3 2.8 -.2 2.7 -.4 2.5 -.5
1.71 -8.0 1.78 -4.2 1.78 -4.3 1.7 -11.1 1.79 -3.9 1.66 -10.7
(A) Percentage growth rates except otherwise marked. Figures in columns (A) were obtained applying the deviations from baseline derived from the simulations carried out
by the IMF in August 1987 to the reference scenario depicted in table 4.
(B) For GNP, deflator and exchange rate, percentage deviations from levels in the baseline (or reference scenario); for current account balance, absolute deviations.
Source: Authors’ calculations on IMF data.Table 6
Alternative Fiscal Scenarios in Interlink
3> Scenario 3 m
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Fiscal Restriction in United States, ~>
Pure Dollar Fiscal Restriction Expansion in Japan and ¢~
Depreciation in United States Exogenous Dollar Depreciation ~
1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992
(A)    (B)    (A) (B)    (A)    (B) (A) (B)    (A) (B) (A)    (B)
United States
Real GNP 2.3      1.4    1.6     -1.0    1.1    -1.2    1.4 -3.5    1.2    -.5    2.5      -.6
Private Consumption Deflator 6.9 3.7 5.7 9.6 3.7 -.2 3.4    -1.8 4.2 1.0 4.8 2.5
Current Balance
$ Billions -101.0      4.0 -79.0     37.0 -89.0    16.0 -66.0    50.0 -85.0    20.0 -47.0     69.0
Percent of GNP -1.9 .2 -1.2 .7 -1,8 .3 -1.1 .8 -1.7 .4 -.8 1 .!
Japan
Real GNP 1.7     -1.6     3.3     -3.8     2.7     -.4     3.0    -1.4     3.5     1.1     3.3       1.7
Private Consumption Deflator .8 -1.4 .8 -3.8 1.8 -.1 1.6 -.8 1.8 -.4 2.1 0
Current Balance
$ Billions 76.0 -3.0 71.0 -22.0 75.0 -4.0 79.0 14.0 71.0 -8.0 55.0 -38.0
Percent of GNP 2.2 -.6 1.6 -1.0 2.7 -,1 2.3 -.3 2.4 -.4 1.5 -1.1
Real Exchange Rate (Yen/S) 145.7 -15.9 145.7 -15.9 !73.1 -.1 171.5 -1.0 !72.2 -.6 174.2 .5
Germany
Real GNP 1.1 0 2.4 -1.1 .9 -.4 1.9 -1.1 .9 -.5 2.0 -1.0
Private Consumption Deflator 1.3 -.5 .8 -1.8 1.5 -,1 1,1 -.6 1.4 -.3 .8 -1.8
Current Balance
$ Billions 37.0 5.0 30.0 -4,0 30.0 -2.0 26.0 -8.0 30.0 -2.0 26.0 -8.0
Percent of GNP 2.5 0 1,6 -.4 2.4 -.! 1.7 -.5 2.3 -.2 1.7 -.5
Real Exchange Rate (DM/$) 1.75 -11.4 1.75 -11.4 1.98 -.1 1.95 -1.2 1.96 -.7 2.02 2.3
(A) Percentage growth rates except otherwise marked. For scenario 2, the figures in columns (A) were obtained by applying the deviations from baseline derived from the
simulations carried out by the OECD in April 1987 to the reference scenario depicted in Table 4.
(B) For GNP, deflator and exchange rate, percentage deviations from levels in the baseline (or reference scenario); for current account balance, absolute deviations.
Source: Authors’ calculations on QECD data.Key Assumptions for the Scenarios with Pure Dollar Depreciationa (Tables 5 and 6 )
Multimod Interlink
Fiscal Poficy. Unchanged policy setting with respect to the reference
scenario and endogenous revenues.
Monetary Policy
United States: Monetary conditions are tightened in order to avoid
inflationary consequences of dollar depreciation; interest rates rise
above the level in the reference scenario.
Japan and Germany: Interest rates decline somewhat with the
appreciaiton of the currencies, as monetary growth rates remain
unchanged.
Exchange Rates: A constraint is imposed over the ratio of U.S. net
foreign indebtedness to GNP, that it must not exceed 15 percent in
1995, as against 22 percent in the reference scenario. Therefore,
the exchange value of the dollar is assumed to decline in a way
consistent with the reduction of U.S. current account deficit that
keeps the foreign debt ratio at the desired level in 1995: the
adjustment takes place in 1988, with the U.S. dollar depreciating by
15 percent in nominal terms against the other major currencies.
a Simulation carried out in August 1987 for Multimod and in Februar~ 1988 for Interlink.
Fiscal Policy. Unchanged policy setting with respect to the reference
scenario and endogenous revenues.
Monetary Policy. Broadly non-accomodating. In particular:
United States: Short-term interest rates are driven up to 9 percent as a
counter to inflation and then fall to 7 percent as output weakens and
inflation pressures ease; long-term interest rates rise from 9 to 11
percent over the projection period.
Japan and Germany: Interest rates decline as inflation falls, with a floor
on short-term rates at 2 percent.
Exchange Rates: During 1988, the U.S. dollar depreciates by 20
percent against the yen and 15 percent against the DM in nominal
terms. Then, exchange rates are constant in nominal terms in 1989,
and broadly stable in real terms in the following years.Key Assumptions for the Scenarios with Fiscal Restriction in United Statesa (Tables 5 and 6)
Multimod Interlink
Fiscal Policy
United States: Federal government non-interest expenditure is
reduced by amounts rising from $42 billion in 1988 to $91 billion in
1992 from the levels assumed in the reference scenario.
Fiscal Policy
United States: Federal government expenditure is gradually reduced
by about $70 billion and proceeds from income taxes increase by
about $50 billion by the end of 1992 from the levels assumed in the
reference scenario.
Japan and Germany: Unchanged policy setting with respect to the
reference scenario and endogenous revenues.
Monetary Policy. Interest rates decline in the United States in order to
keep money growth on target; a reduction of interest rates is also
projected, to a lesser extent, for Japan and Germany.
Japan and Germany: Unchanged policy setting with respect to the
reference scenario and endogenous revenues.
Monetary Policy. U.S. money supply growth decelerates broadly in
line with nominal income, leaving short-term rates unchanged from
the levels in the reference scenario; in Japan and Germany, interest
rates also remain at the reference level.
Exchange Rates: Endogenous variations. Exchange Rates: Nominal exchange rates unchanged from the levels
in the reference scenario.
a Simulation carried out in August 1987 for Multimod and in February 1988 for interlink.
ZKey Assumptions for the Scenarios with Coordinated Fiscal Action and Dollar Depreciationa (Tables 5 and 6)
Multimod Interlink
Fiscal Policy
United States: The same policy setting as in Scenario 2.
Japan: Higher fiscal expenditures in !988-1990 by an amount
equal to 0.5 percent of GNP.
Germany: Lower tax revenues by an amount growing from DM 7.6
billion in 1988 to DM 20 billion in 1991. As a ratio to GNP, the
fiscal stimulus is roughly the same as in Japan.
Fiscal Policy
United States: Starting from 1988, the general government financial deficit
is cut back over four years by a further 2 percent of GNP, compared
with the reference scenario, action being concentrated on government
expenditure.
Japan: Starting from 1988, the general government financial deficit is
increased over four years by a total of 1 percent of GNP compared
with the reference scenario, action being concentrated on government
expenditure; housing investment is increased by 3 percent per annum
compared with the reference scenario.
Germany: The same policy setting as in the reference scenario and
endogenous revenues.
Monetary Poficy: Interest rates decline in the United States and Monetary Poficy: Assumed to be broadly non-accomodating. In particular:
rise in Japan and Germany, in order to keep money growth on United States: Unchanged money growth and lower interest rates
target, compared with the reference scenario.
Japan: Interest rates are assumed to be initially slightly higher than in the
reference scenario before falling towards the end of the project period.
Germany: Interest rates are rather lower than in the reference scenario
reflecting weaker output growth and lower inflation.
Exchange Rates: Endogenous variations. Exchange Rates: Steady decline of the U.S. and the Canadian dollars
against other OECD countries of 2 percent per annum in nominal terms
relative to the reference scenario.
a Simulation carried out in August 1987 for Multimod and in February 1988 for Interlink.IMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 41
space, we show only the first and last years of the simulations, 1989 and
1992. Details of the assumptions are given in the notes to tables 5 and 6.
In Scenario 1 in table 5 we see the movement illustrated in figure 5
earlier. In 1989 the yen appreciates against the dollar in real terms by 7.1
percent and the DM by 8.0 percent. By 1992, these numbers are down to
2.7 and 4.2 percent. This shows the upward jump in the U.S. real
exchange rate in figure 5, followed by the gradual fall.
The dollar depreciation is accompanied by a rise in the interest rate
in the United States, and a fall in Japan and Germany. So the effect on
demand is unclear in all cases. The depreciation stimulates demand in
the United States, but the increase in the interest rate depresses it, and
vice versa in Japan and Germany. On balance, the interest rate effect
dominates in the short run in the United States, and the exchange rate
effect dominates in Japan and Germany, as the growth rate of real GNP
falls in all areas. These effects diminish in the longer run, and reverse by
1992 in Japan and Germany. The relatively smaller effects on real GNP
in Multimod improve its correspondence to the theoretical model.
Multimod and Interlink both include empirical lags of adjustment of
trade flows behind changes in exchange rates--J-curve effects. Thus the
U.S. current account deficit in Scenario 1 of table 5 falls by $36.6 billion
in 1989 and $86.1 billion in 1992. To see the effects on the current
accounts of Japan and Germany, it is better to use the local currency
numbers as a percent of GNP, since the exchange rates are falling
against the dollar. The Japanese current account surplus falls by 0.2
percent of GNP in 1989 and 0.4 percent in 1992. These effects are smaller
than the U.S. results. The German surplus shrinks by 0.4 percent of
GNP in 1989, but that effect disappears by 1992.
Scenario 2 in table 5 shows the effect of a gradual reduction in U.S.
government spending by an amount that increases from $42 billion in
1988 to $91 billion in 1992, relative to the baseline. This has a small
depressive effect on U.S. growth throughout the simulation. The reduc-
tion of output growth in Japan and Germany is a little larger in the short
run, but disappears by 1992. The yen appreciates against the dollar in
real terms by an amount that increases from 2.8 percent in 1989 to 6.6
percent in 1992. The corresponding numbers for the DM are 4.3 and 11.1
percent.
The fiscal shift and the dollar depreciation reduce the U.S. current
account deficit by $10.2 billion in 1989 and $36.7 billion in 1992. The
effects on the current accounts of Japan and Germany are smaller, but go
in the right direction. Since only the United States takes the fiscal action
in the simulation, the gain to the U.S. current account is spread across
all areas of the world.
Scenario 3 in table 5 adds a gradually growing fiscal stimulus in
Japan and Germany to Scenario 2. The negative effect on U.S. growth is
unaffected, while the negative effects in Japan and Germany are re-42 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
duced. The effects on the real exchange rates and on the current account
balances are increased. The reduction in the U.S. current account deficit
in 1992 in Scenario 3 is $42.8 billion, compared with $36.7 billion in
Scenario 2.
Comparison of the exchange rate and U.S. current account effects in
Scenarios 1 and 3 is instructive. The early depreciation in Scenario 1
results in a larger improvement in the U.S. current account in both 1989
and 1992. Presumably this difference would be reversed eventually as
the fiscal shift persists, but the result illustrates the gains from early
action on the exchange rate, if action is inevitable.
The Interlink simulations are shown in table 6. In Scenario 1 the
dollar is depreciated in nominal terms by 20 percent against the yen and
15 percent against the DM in 1988, and held roughly constant subse-
quently. The result is appreciation of the yen and DM that is larger than
in the Multimod simulation in 1989, and even larger in 1992. The effects
on the growth rates of real GNP in Interlink are quite different from
those in Multimod. The U.S. growth rate increases in the short run, but
falls by 1992. The negative effect on growth in Japan is the same in 1989,
but increases to 1992 in Interlink. There is no short-run effect in
Germany in 1989, but a negative effect by 1992. Interlink seems to show
cumulating negative effects on real GNP growth over time in all three
countries from a one-time real depreciation of the dollar.
The U.S. current account deficit in Scenario I of table 6 is essentially
unchanged in dollar terms in 1989, although the increase in the growth
rate suggests significant positive quantity effects. By 1992, the gain is
$37.0 billion, less than half that of Multimod with a much larger dollar
depreciation. The current account surplus of Japan is reduced in
Interlink by more than in Multimod, even with the lower growth path of
output. There is little effect on the German surplus in either model in
Scenario 1.
The fiscal restriction in the United States in the Interlink Scenario 2
is about 30 percent larger than in Multimod. By 1992, the U.S. current
account deficit is reduced by $37 billion in the Multimod simulation and
$50 billion in Interlink. The depressive effects on real GNP growth are
much larger in Interlink than in Multimod, and relatively larger in the
United States than in Japan or Germany. As a result, with roughly
constant real exchange rates in Interlink, the reduction in the U.S.
current account deficit and the Japanese and German surpluses are
larger than in the Multimod Scenario 2.
The Interlink Scenario 3 has government spending in Japan greater
by 1 percent of GNP than in the reference scenario, and housing
investment growing 3 percent per year faster. U.S. and German policies
are the same as in Scenario 2. The result, in the last panel of table 6, is
a small reduction in the growth rate in the United States, a larger
increase in Japan, and a substantial decrease in Germany, relative to theIMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 43
reference scenario. With real exchange rates roughly constant, this
pattern of changes in demand produces a substantial reduction in the
U.S. surplus, larger than in the Multimod Scenario 3, and an even larger
reduction in the Japanese deficit. The effects on Germany come from the
combination of the changes in growth in the United States and Japan,
and on balance give a reduction of the surplus by about 0.5 percent of
GNP by 1992.
From the simulation results, the Multimod seems to show current
accounts more sensitive to changes in exchange rates than in Interlink.
The latter has real GNP more sensitive to fiscal policy, and obtains its
effects on current accounts from fiscal shifts through this channel. The
Multimod simulations correspond more closely to our theoretical model
described earlier, and show the effects of fiscal actions on the exchange
rate. Presumably if the exchange rate were endogenized in the Interlink
simulations, its movements would dampen output effects. For example,
as fiscal policy tightens in the United States, the dollar depreciation
contributes an expansionary force to demand. In that case, the effects of
the fiscal shifts would be seen to come more through the exchange rate
channel, as in Multimod.
Expansionary Monetary Policy in Japan and Germany
In this section we report the results of alternative simulations using
the Multimod unit multipliers, and assuming monetary rather than
fiscal expansion in Japan and Germany. We have three reasons for
studying this option. First, with only fiscal contraction in the United
States, the growth rate of real GNP falls in all three countries in the
simulations of tables 4 and 5, and substantially so in the Interlink
simulation. Second, as theory and the Multimod simulations show, the
dollar will depreciate with either fiscal action in the United States alone
or joint fiscal action. Using Multimod, we can find the degree of
monetary expansion abroad that would prevent a jump in the dollar at
the time of the fiscal shift in the United States or hold the average of the
nominal exchange rates constant over the simulation period. This is how
the alternative simulations are formulated. Third, a balanced joint fiscal
action would leave world real interest rates high, while our alternatives
would reduce them by reducing the aggregate world fiscal deficit. This
can be seen by summing equations (1) and. (2) to obtain the world
saving-investment balance:
D + D* -- S(r) + S*(r*). (5)
A reduction in D and equal increase in D* would reduce r and increase
r*, leaving the average world real interest rate unchanged. But a
reduction in D alone would reduce both rates in the short run, and the44 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
U.S. rate in the long run. A reduction in average world real interest rates
would benefit debtors, especially in the developing countries.
To perform the alternative simulations, we used the Multimod unit
multipliers to formulate two alternative expansionary paths for mone-
tary policy in Japan and Germany. The first is the amount of monetary
expansion in 1988 in Japan and Germany that would offset the effects on
their nominal exchange rates against the dollar in 1989 in the Multimod
Scenario 2. These are 3.7 percent in Japan and 4.6 percent in Germany.
These are the step increases in the money supply that would just offset
the effects of the announcement and implementation of the fiscal
program in table 5, Scenario 2, on nominal exchange rates at the time of
the announcement. These were implemented in the simulation along
with the Scenario 2 fiscal program. The money supplies subsequently
grow at the rates in Scenario 2. The results are shown as Scenario 4 in
table 7.
The policy alternatives in Scenario 4 resemble the policy actions
actually in place since late 1986. Comparing M1 growth rates, in Japan
M1 growth increased by 5.5 percentage points from 1985 to 1987, and in
Germany it increased by 4.7 percentage points. Over the same period,
the U.S. fiscal deficit was reduced by 1.9 percent of GNP. So Scenario 4
can be taken to approximate actual policy since 1986, as well as
prospective policy in 1988.
The second monetary alternative was formulated as the increase in
the average rate of growth of money in Japan and Germany that would
offset the average effects on their nominal exchange rates in Multimod
Scenario 2 over the simulation period. These are 1.7 percent in Japan
and 2.3 percent in Germany. These increases in money growth rates
were implemented in the simulation along with the Scenario 2 fiscal
program. The results are shown as Scenario 5 in table 7.
Scenarios 4 and 5 in table 7 can be usefully compared with Scenarios
2 and 3 in table 5. A slight reduction in real growth in the United States
occurs in Scenarios 4 and 5 compared to 2 and 3, but real growth
increases in 1989 and 1992 in Japan and Germany. The real appreciation
of both the yen and the DM is reduced in 1989 in both Scenarios 4 and
5 compared to Scenario 2. By 1992, the yen appreciates by about the
same in Scenarios 4 and 2, but less in Scenario 5. The appreciation of the
DM is less throughout Scenarios 4 and 5.
The reduction in the U.S. current account deficit in 1992 is $38.3
billion in Scenario 4 and $35.8 billion in Scenario 5, about the same as the
$36.7 billion of Scenario 2 and less than the $42.8 billion of Scenario 3.
With less appreciation of their currencies in the monetary policy
simulations, the current account surpluses of Japan and Germany are
not reduced in Scenarios 4 and 5 relative to the reference scenario,
except for the reduction of 0.2 percent of GNP in Germany in 1992 in
Scenario 4. The faster growth in Japan and Germany in Scenarios 4 andIMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 45
Table 7
Alternative Monetary Scenarios in Multimod
Scenario 4a Scenario 5b
1989 1992 1989 1992













2.9 -.7 2.9 -.5     3.0 -.6    2,8 -.8
3.3 -.3 3.1 -1.0     3.4 -.2    2.9 -1.3
-122.3 6.1 -89,7 38.3 -119,2 9.2 -92.2 35.8
-2,4 .1 -1.5 ,6 -2.4 .1 -1.5 .6
3,8 .1 3.6 .6 3.8 -,1 4.0 1.4
1,8 .5 1.3 0 1.8 .1 2.3 1.8
Real Exch, Rate (Yen/S)
Germany
Real GNP                1,6 .7 2.4 1,5 2.2
GNP De~lator 1,6 -.3 2.4 -.3 1.7
Current balance
$ Billions 41,8 .3 50.0 2,4 42.5
Percent of GNP 3,1 0 2.8 -.2 3.2
Real Exch. Rate (DM/$) 1.86 .1 1.69 -9.1 1,87
77.8 3,2 81.8 6.8 75,3 ,7 91,6 16,6
2,5 .1 2.1 .1 2.5 .1 2.4 .4






fiscal maneuver in ~ Once-and-for-all money shock neutralizing exchange rate variations due to U.S.
1989.
b Sustained money shock neutralizing average exchange rate variations due to U.S. fiscal maneuver over
five years.
(A) Percentage growth rate except otherwise marked.
(B) For GNP, deflator and exchange rate, percentage deviations from levels in the baseline (or reference
scenario); for current account balance, absolute deviations.
5 is partially generated by less current account adjustment. So the gain
in stabilization of the bilateral exchange rates comes at the cost of current
account adjustment in Japan and Germany. In these cases the improve-
ment in the U.S. current account comes from the rest of the world.
Thus the scenarios of fiscal contraction in the United States and
monetary expansion abroad yield mixed results. They would give
approximately the same result for the U.S. current account deficit, with
better results for growth in Japan and Germany, than the balanced fiscal
package. They would also increase world saving and produce a bonus
for the developing country debtors in the form of lower world real
interest rates. But by stabilizing real exchange rates over the simulation
period, they eliminate current account adjustment in Japan and Ger-
many. This loss may be more than balanced by the gains from growth in
Japan and Germany and lower world real interest rates.46 William H. Branson and Grazia Marchese
Appendix: Two-Country Fundamentals Model
This appendix sets out the algebra of the model of exchange-rate
and debt dynamics in the text. This is an extension of the fundamentals
model presented in Branson (1985 and 1988), to include rational expec-
tations dynamics. It permits us to analyze the effects of anticipated shifts
in fiscal policy. The model has two countries or areas, home and foreign
with starred * variables. We lay out first the expressions for the loci in e,
B space that control the current-account and exchange-rate dynamics,
and study their movements. Then we lay out the long-run equilibrium
solution.
Current Account and Debt Dynamics
The current account surplus of the home country (X), and the deficit
of the foreign country (- X), give the rate of change of net debt (B) of the
home country. We assume the current account itself depends on the real
exchange rate (e) and the debt position:
X(e, B) = -1~. (A.1)
Here the partial derivative Xe > 0 gives the effect of the real exchange
rate on the trade balance, and Xb < .0 gives the effect of the debt position
on the flow of debt service. The B = 0 locus in figure 1 comes from
equation (A.1). Its slope is given by --(XB/Xe) > 0. Above the l~ = 0 locus
X > 0, and B is decreasing. Below it, B increases. Anything that shifts
the current account balance for given values of e and B shifts the I~ = 0
locus.
Exchange Rate Dynamics
Exchange rate dynamics and interest rates are determined by the
two national income equilibrium conditions and the open interest parity
condition that links the two financial markets. The national income
equilibrium conditions are:
D = S(r) - X(e, B), and (A.2)
D* -- S*(r*) + X(e, B). (A.3)
Here D and D* are the home and foreign fiscal deficits, S and S* are the
excess of private saving over investment, and r and r* are the real
interest rates. We assume S’, S*’ > 0. Financial market equilibrium is
characterized by the open interest parity condition on real interest rates:
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Here ~ is the rationally expected rate of change of the real exchange rate,
and p is the risk premium on home currency assets, with p’ > 0.
The characteristics of the equilibrium locus along which ~ = 0 in
figure 1 can be obtained by setting ~ = 0 in equation (A.4), and then
totally differentiating (A.2) - (A.4) to solve for e, r, and r* as functions
of D, D*, and B. The total differential, in matrix form, is equation (A.5):
A B
A.3 S*’ e dr* = - 0 dD
A.4 - 1 [de J 0 dD*
(A.5)
The determinant of the A matrix is given by
IAI = Xo(S’ + S*’) > 0.
The solutions from (A.5) are given in table A.1. The term in de/dB
is the slope of ~ = 0, and the terms in de/dD and de/dD* give the vertical
shift in ~ = 0 with a change in one of the fiscal positions. The terms in
the dr and dr* columns give the impact effect of a change in the debt
position or in either fiscal position on the two interest rates. The slope
term de/dB is larger than --(XB/Xe), the slope of 1) = 0. The two shift
terms de/dD and de/dD* show that an increase in the home budget
deficit shifts ~ = 0 down, and an increase in the foreign deficit shifts it
up.
The dynamics of ~ are given by the vertical arrows in figure 1. If e
is above the ~ = 0 locus, then X in equations (A.2) and (A.3) is larger
than the value consistent with ~ = 0 for given B, D, D*. This means that
r must be larger than consistent with ~ = 0 for (A.2) to hold, and r*
Table A.1
Short-run Comparative Statics of ~ = 0
Endogenous Variables
Exogenous
Variables dr dr* de
dB p’S*’Xe > 0 p’S*’Xe < 0 S’S*’p’ Xb > 0
dD Xe >0 X-2 >0 -- <0
IAI IAI IAI
Xe Xe S’
dD* -- >0 -->0 -->0
IAI IAI IAI48 William H. Branson and Graz& Marchese
smaller for (A.3) to hold. With r - r* larger than consistent with ~ = 0,
from (A.4) ~ must be positive. If the exchange rate is expected to rise,
under rational expectations it does rise. So for a point above the ~ = 0
locus to be consistent with equilibrium, e must be rising, and below it,
falling.
Equilibrium Dynamics
Dynamic adjustment to the long-run equilibrium proceeds along
the ss saddle path in figure 1. This is the unique path that has the two
essential properties that (a) it leads to the equilibrium, and (b) along it
expectations of ~ are realized. All other paths are unstable "bubbles"
that diverge to an asymptote normal to the ss path. Following a
disturbance that shifts either the ~ = 0 or the 1~ = 0 locus, for a given
existing debt position the real exchange rate jumps onto the new ss
path, and then the debt position and the exchange rate follow the ss
path to the new equilibrium.
The comparative status of the long-run equilibrium can be obtained
from equations (A.1) - (A.4) with X and ~ set to zero. From (A.2) and
(A.3) with X = 0, we get in the long-run equilibrium,
dr =_1 dD, and dr*                  _- __1 dD*.               (A.6)
S’              S*’
From the arbitrage equation (A.4) and (A.6) we obtain
dB = P’ ~dD- S,--7dD* .
Finally, from (A.1) with X = 0 and (A.7) we obtain
(A.7)
(A.8)
The long-run solution is recursive.
As an illustration of the adjustment process, consider the effect of
an unanticipated increase in the home fiscal deficit D (or decrease in D*),
shown in figure 2. The initial equilibrium is Eo, from the previous figure.
The increase in D shifts the 6 = 0 locus down, according to the sign of
de/dD in table A.1. This shifts the adjustment path ss down to sis1 in
figure 2, running into the long-run equilibri.um E2, where the new ~ = 0
locus (not shown) intersects the unshifted B = 0 locus.
The real exchange rate jumps down to point E1, through a nominal
appreciation of the home currency if price levels are slow to adjust. AtIMBALANCES IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 49
point E~, the real exchange rate is expected to rise along sls~. The
appreciation generates a current account deficit that contributes to the
finance of the budget deficit. The home interest rate exceeds r* + p(B0)
by the expected rate of increase of e.
The model exhibits an overshooting of the real exchange rate in
response to a fiscal disturbance, in that the initial real appreciation is
reversed in the increment to E2o In order to service the increase in debt
from Bo to B2, the home currency must eventually depreciate relative to
Eo. But to accumulate the increase in debt, it must first appreciate to E~.
The path from Eo to E~, and back toward E2 describes roughly the
adjustment process of the U.S. real exchange rate and current account
since 1980, with the 1988 point somewhat higher than E0, but not yet at
E2. It is higher than Eo because the real exchange rate has depreciated a
bit relative to 1980, at least by the OECD’s (1988) competitiveness
measure. The contention that it has not yet reached E2 follows from the
hypothesis that at the existing level of e, the current account deficit
would not go to zero. This implies further depreciation, in the absence
of any further fiscal adjustment.
The main problem with this explanation of the path of the dollar
since 1980 is that in fact the dollar appreciated in a series of irregular
jumps from 1980 to 1985, rather than one single jump early in the
period. The single jump from E0 to E1 would occur if the budget shifts
had occurred fully when announced. In fact, the deficit in the United
States emerged gradually, following a path that must have seemed
uncertain from the point of view of the foreign exchange market.This
could account for the irregular path to 1985. In addition, the 1985 peak
could well have resulted from a temporary divergence onto a bubble
path, as was argued by Krugman (1985).
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Paul R. Krugman*
This paper by William Branson and Grazia Marchese operates on
two levels. At one level it presents a set of simulation results from major
econometric models of the international economy, analyzing projections
and alternative policy experiments. At the same time, the paper ana-
lyzes the same issues in terms of a small-scale theoretical model, in effect
using it to model not only the world but also the bigger models. The
result is an interesting mix, in which the sometimes obscure channels of
influence in big models are illumined by the little model, while the little
model gains in apparent relevance by the numerical results afforded by
the bigger systems. In my comments I want to focus primarily on the
small model, and on some aspects of the world that is being modeled.
On the whole I am highly sympathetic to the approach taken here.
The small model embodies a basic point about international adjustments
that ought to be universally accepted, but still is not. In mapping from
the model to reality, however, there are some problems for which I have
no good solution, but that I wish the authors had made more of.
What is important and right about the approach taken here is the
emphasis on the complementarity of expenditure-switching and expen-
diture-reducing policies in any reduction of the U.S. external deficit. The
current account balance is S-I; it cannot be narrowed unless the
savings-investment gap is closed. But the current account is also X-M;
the United States must sell more goods abroad or buy fewer foreign
goods as part of the process of deficit reduction, which can only be
accomplished by making U.S. goods and services relatively cheaper.
*Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.52 Paul R. Krugman
Thus, reducing the deficit requires both a reduction in domestic demand
and a depreciation of the dollar.
This should be an obvious point, yet it~is one that policymakers
seem oddly reluctant to accept. On the one side, some politicians,
especially in the United States, seem to believe that currency deprecia-
tion can somehow solve the trade deficit all by itself, without any need
for a domestic belt-tightening. On the other side, many central banks
seem to believe that a lower U.S. budget deficit will somehow translate
directly into a lower trade deficit, without any need for a lower dollar
(and perhaps can even strengthen the dollar). The virtue of a model like
this one is that it makes clear why exchange rate and expenditure
adjustment are not alternatives, but necessarily go together.
While the model is useful for making this point, I am less convinced
that a model like this one is adequate for understanding the economics
of the dollar. There are two key problems. The minor one is the handling
of lags, the major one the handling of expectations.
The point about lags should be apparent. While the econometric
models used in the paper allow for slow trade adjustment, the theoret-
ical model does not--and for that matter, even the econometric models
almost surely understate the long-run effects of exchange rate changes.
U.S. experience since the dollar began declining has demonstrated that
the long lags in trade adjustment are surely as crucial a part of exchange
rate dynamics as price adjustment or growing international indebted-
ness, which are the usual focus of dynamic exchange rate models. I
think that the J-curve should be placed at the center of the story, not
simply be given an occasional mention.
The other problem, which is harder to solve, is that of expectations.
To close their model, the authors assume rational expectations--the
device we all use, because of the lack of any good alternative. They then
go on to suggest that the predictions of the model using this assumption
track more or less the rise and fall of the dollar as it actually happened.
Unfortunately, that just is not true.
The problem is that rational expectations, however persuasive as a
modeling device, is an assumption that has no backing in the observed
behavior of exchange markets, or indeed of financial markets in general.
To take the simplest kind of test, forward rates not only are inefficient
predictors of future spot rates, they are worse predictors than current
spot rates; indeed, for many samples, forward premia are actually
negatively correlated with subsequent exchange rate changes. Attempts
to explain these results by invoking shifting risk premia look more and
more like Ptolemaic epicycles, and the historical patterns of supposed
risk premia do not make sense (a high risk premium on dollar assets
when the dollar was rising, a negative premium when it was falling).
Furthermore, it is by now a familiar point that the dollar’s strength at its
peak made no sense at all--had the dollar fallen as slowly as the marketDISCUSSION 53
apparently believed possible, the United States would have accumu-
lated an infinite foreign debt.
No good answer exists to the question of how to model an irrational
market. Ad hoc formulations of expectations formatit~n are sometimes
better metaphors for historical experience than rational expectations, but
are subject to the Lucas critique. Models in which apparent irrationality
is the result of a learning process when agents do not initially know the
model are interesting but not really usable at this point. So I have no
good alternative suggestion. All that I can advocate is caution: readers
should be warned that our models do not account for history very well
at all.Discussion
Yoshio Suzuki*
I found the paper by Professor Branson and Ms. Marchese ex-
tremely stimulating, because it dealt explicitly with the question of
adjustment of external imbalances between the United States, Japan and
West Germany, a matter of great concern for both policymakers and
academics in each country. Since the paper is made up of a theoretical
model and policy simulations, I take them up in turn. With respect to
the theoretical model, I basically agree with the analytical framework.
The paper tries to explain the relationship between expansionary
fiscal policy in the United States and the movements of the dollar
exchange rate in the 1980s using a simple theoretical model. In this
model, the exchange risk premium is one of the primary determinants of
the real exchange rate, together with real-interest-rate differentials.
Since it is difficult to explain the sharp depreciation of the dollar after
1985 without taking into account the effect of the risk premium that
emerged from the massive current account imbalances, I agree to their
emphasis on the risk premium factor.
However, this theoretical model is in some respects not necessarily
relevant to the policy simulations and proposals discussed in the latter
part of the paper. For instance, it is applicable only to the analysis of the
effects of fiscal policy, not those of monetary policy, since it deals
exclusively with the relationships among real variables, not nominal
variables. However, the policy actions that the authors most strongly
recommend in the latter half of the paper involve an expansionary
monetary policy in Japan and in West Germany.
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I have another reservation with respect to the specification of the
current account balance in this theoretical model. It is assumed that the
current balance, excluding the investment income balance, depends
solely on the real exchange rate. This assumption seems to come from
the underlying model, in which the trade balance is determined by the
real exchange rate and domestic and foreign gross national products.
The cyclical movements in GNPs are then abstracted. This assumption is
justifiable if the dominant portion of imports consists of intermediate
goods and raw materials. In this case, the level of imports is essentially
determined by the GNP. However, the ratio of imports of final goods to
total imports is relatively high in the United States, and this ratio has
been on an upward trend in Japan. Therefore, in both countries, imports
depend not only on production but also on absorption. This implies that
even if the real exchange rate and domestic and foreign GNPs are stable,
the U.S. current imbalances can still be improved if the domestic
absorption of the U.S. is suppressed, for instance by cutting the U.S.
budget deficits. According to the model adopted here, the current
account deficit of the United States cannot be eliminated without a
further depreciation of the dollar, since the role of absorption in the
current balance is ignored in the model. I am rather skeptical about this
view.
Now, let me turn my attention to the simulation results and policy
implications. The paper provides several possible scenarios of the future
adjustment process.
(1) In Scenario 2, only the United States takes policy action and cuts
its budget deficit. The merit of this scenario is a decline in the
world real interest rate, while the demerit is a decline in the
world growth rate.
(2) So, in Scenario 3, expansionary fiscal policy in Japan and West
Germany is added to Scenario 2. The gain is a speed-up of the
current account adjustment process due to a further deprecia-
tion of the dollar, and an increase in the growth rate, while the
loss is that the world interest rate, on average, does not fall as
compared to Scenario 2.
(3) In the last two scenarios, 4 and 5, which are preferred by
Branson and Marchese, Japan and West Germany follow an
expansionary monetary policy instead of a fiscal one, while the
United States adopts the same contractionary fiscal policy as is
the case in Scenario 3. In these scenarios, the world economy
can maintain a high growth rate; thus, Scenarios 4 and 5 are
better than Scenario 2. The world real interest rate falls; and so
Scenarios 4 and 5 are better than Scenario 3. The major loss with
these scenarios is the relatively slow adjustment of external56 Yoshio Suzuki
imbalances, in comparison with the other scenarios. But the
authors conclude that two gains are .superior to one loss.
I appreciate the clear-cut discussion presented here, and I would
have agreed to the proposals of Scenarios 4 and 5 if the time had been
1986. However, the serious problem of this simulation today is the large
difference between the assumed baseline forecasts for 1988 and the most
recent actual data. Regarding Japan, the real growth rate in the first half
of 1988 was 6 percent over the same period of the previous year, and the
real growth rate for 1988 is now expected to be almost 6 percent. This
growth rate is much higher than the IMF baseline of 3.7 percent or the
OECD baseline of 3.4 percent. The IMF itself has already revised its
estimate upward to 5.8 percent for 1988 and from 3.7 percent to 4.2
percent for 1989, in the latest World Economic Outlook. Also, the ratio of
current account surplus to GNP in Japan has already fallen to 2.5 percent
in the second quarter of 1988; this level is projected for 1989 in Scenarios
4 and 5. It has already been achieved a year in advance without any new
policy.
Although these forecast errors by the IMF and the OECD are not the
fault of these authors, they represent a serious problem with their
simulation exercises. This rapid expansion of the Japanese economy is
largely due to five successive cuts in the official discount rate in 1986 and
1987 to 2.5 percent, the lowest level in the history of the Bank of Japan.
We also allowed a significant acceleration in the rate of monetary growth
(in terms of M2 + CDs), which reached 12 percent at the end of 1987
compared with the appropriate long-run trend of 8 percent. Germany
also has permitted an overshooting of its monetary target in recent
years. However, the paper does not mention this expansionary mone-
tary policy stance that has already been taken by Japan and Germany
since 1986, and its results. Actually, a part of the policy recommendation
of this paper, namely expansionary monetary policy in Japan and
Germany, has already been implemented. The part that has not been
implemented yet is the reduction of the U.S. budget deficits. The world
is now worrying about a possible acceleration of inflation as a result of
expansionary monetary policy in 1986 and 1987 in Japan and Germany
without the promised cut in the U.S. budget deficits.
Taking account of these factors, this policy proposal should have
been presented in 1986. In 1986 and through 1987, Japan has conducted
an expansionary monetary policy in line with this proposal, while the
United States has not cut its budget deficits enough. On the one hand,
this has led to the expansion of the Japanese economy, one of the gains
of this proposed scenario; but on the other hand, slow improvements in
the U.S. current-account deficits and insufficient reductions in real
interest rates continue, corresponding to the other, unrealized gains of
the proposed scenario.DISCUSSION 57
A rapid reduction of U.S..budget deficits is urgently needed. Even
if the yen is forced to appreciate to some extdnt as a consequence, it
would be desirable for the Japanese economy because it would reduce
the possibility of excessive economic expansion and acceleration of the
inflation rate. If the deflationary effects of the reduction of the U.S.
budget deficits are much larger than expected, and if the Japanese
economy threatens to go into a recession, Japan can take expansionary
fiscal policy action without a large increase in its real interest rate, since
the economy already has enough liquidity as a result of the past
monetary expansion.
Lastly, the suggested loss in this proposed scenario, namely the
possible delay in the externaMmbalance adjustment, might not be as
serious as predicted in the paper, when we consider the role of
absorption, through which the cut in U.S. budget deficit affects the
demand side. According to the empirical investigation by Hooper and
Mann (1987) at the Federal Reserve Board, the increase in the U.S.
current account deficits in the 1980s is largely attributable to the change
in the real exchange rate when GNPs are used as explanatory variables.
However, the role of the real exchange rate is significantly lessened and
the role of the demand factor turns out to be more important, when
absorption levels are used instead of GNPs. Considering the fact that the
ratio of final goods imports to the total is about 50 percent in the United
States, the effect of the cut in the U.S. budget deficits on its current
account deficits may be quite large even if there is no further deprecia-
tion of the dollar.
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